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Notes
The Extraction Industry in Latin America and the
Protection of Indigenous Land and Natural
Resource Rights: From Consultation Toward Free,
Prior, and Informed Consent
KYLAH STALEY†
Resource extraction and exploitation threaten the survival of Indigenous and tribal peoples, who
are amongst the most marginalized communities in the world. This is both a human rights issue
and an environmental issue. There are around 300 million people that make up Indigenous
communities worldwide, the majority of whom live in forests. Furthermore, Indigenous customary
lands contain 80% of the world’s biodiversity. Traditionally, Indigenous communities have been
stewards of their lands, where they regard the land as means for their own physical, spiritual,
and cultural survival rather than a commodity to be exploited. The only protection Indigenous
Peoples have against resource extraction in international law, under the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples (ILO) Convention 169, is the right to consultation and participation. Effectively,
Indigenous communities have limited decision-making power in this context. This narrow
protection of Indigenous Peoples’ lands and natural resources under ILO Convention 169 is
inadequate and informed by a colonial past. For there to be adequate protections of Indigenous
Peoples’ land and resource rights, Indigenous Peoples must hold actual decision-making power,
not just participatory power. Free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) is the principle and right
that is critical to safeguarding Indigenous lands and resources as it is grounded in the
foundational right of self-determination. Thus, I argue operationalizing FPIC would provide a
comprehensive protection of Indigenous rights by ensuring that affected Indigenous communities
(1) design the procedures for obtaining their consent (2) retain negotiating power and (3) actually
agree to proposed projects.

†

Kylah Staley, J.D. 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

1145

1146

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1147
I. ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 & UNDRIP ................................................. 1150
II. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO
CONSULTATION AND FPIC ............................................................. 1155
A. INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE ILO, UN, AND THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ......................... 1155
B. IMPLEMENTING THE CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT: BOLIVIA
AND PERU ............................................................................... 1160
III. FPIC AS A FORM OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY?................. 1164
IV. SOLUTIONS ......................................................................................... 1168
CONCLUSION............................................................................................. 1171

May 2022

TOWARD FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT

1147

INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore the scope of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO)
Convention 1691 regarding Indigenous Peoples’ right to consultation and free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIC). Currently, the Convention is the only
binding legal instrument on Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights.2 Thus, the
Convention is of particular importance to Indigenous Peoples who reside in the
twenty-three countries (thirteen in Latin-America) that have ratified the
Convention and want to seek legal recourse to protect and vindicate their rights. 3
However, with regard to resource extraction, the Convention qualifies
Indigenous land rights by prioritizing state sovereignty over natural resources
and deliberately leaves Indigenous Peoples with the inferior right to
consultation.4 Because the right to consultation is the international legal ceiling
for Indigenous Peoples’ rights, Indigenous rights must be expanded so
Indigenous communities have real decision-making power with regard to
extraction projects that affect their lands.
The right to self-determination is central to realizing Indigenous Peoples’
decision-making power because it grants Indigenous Peoples the power to
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development,”5 which necessarily includes the right to develop and
“maintain their ancestral territory . . . within a specific state.”6 Selfdetermination is thus a “pillar right”—it is the foundation and origin of all other
Indigenous rights.7 The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), is one
of the rights grounded in self-determination,8 and is a substantive procedural
mechanism through which self-determination can be advanced. The primary
difference between the right to consultation and the right to FPIC is that
consultation focuses on the unilateral act of communicating and informing
Indigenous Peoples of an extraction project, and while the affected peoples may
participate by raising concerns, they cannot negotiate how the project is carried
out. The right to FPIC, on the other hand, “guarantees community driven
consultations and decision-making processes and ensures that [I]ndigenous

1. Hereinafter referred to in this Article as “the Convention.”
2. Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 28383 [hereinafter Convention (No. 169)].
3. Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), INT’L LAB. ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2022). (It is important to note that the United States is not a party to the Convention.).
4. Roger Merino, Law and Politics of Indigenous Self-Determination: The Meaning of the Right to Prior
Consultation, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AS SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL Law 120, 130 (Irene Watson ed., 2017).
5. G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 3, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
6. Merino, supra note 4, at 121; UNDRIP, supra note 5, at art. 25.
7. Hum. Rts. Council, Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based Approach: Study of the
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/62, at 3 (2018) [hereinafter
FPIC].
8. Id.
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[P]eoples can effectively determine the outcome of decision-making that affects
them.”9
Despite the benefits the right to FPIC confers on Indigenous Peoples, FPIC
has been characterized as a threat to national development10 because states
maintain their permanent sovereignty over natural resources,11 thus granting
them nearly unfettered access to Indigenous lands via subsurface land rights.
However, Indigenous Peoples’ relationship to their lands cannot be understood
in western, capitalistic terms. Traditionally, “land does not represent simply a
possession or means of production . . . [nor] is it a commodity that can be
appropriated.”12 Indigenous Peoples’ relationship with their lands is a
“profoundly spiritual relationship” and one that is central to their cultural
survival.13 Due to this relationship, the environmental benefits Indigenous
Peoples deliver to their lands should not be understated. When Indigenous
Peoples have “clear user rights,” they are “more likely to invest in the good
management of forests, soil and water.”14
Extraction projects are particularly fraught for Indigenous communities
because they frustrate and disrespect this Indigenous-land relationship and come
with “high environmental and social cost[s].”15 These projects tend to be long
term, and leave deep and lasting environmental impacts.16 For example, oil and
gas extraction, spills, and leaks can pollute waterways and degrade
ecosystems.17 Likewise, mining activities yield toxic wastes that contaminate
soil and groundwater and contribute to soil erosion.18 These threats to human
health and the environment have been exacerbated in the mining industry as the
global demand for minerals and metals used to manufacture smartphones,
laptops, and electric storage batteries for electric cars and solar panels has

9. Angus MacInnes, Marcus Colchester & Andrew Whitmore, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: How
to Rectify the Devastating Consequences of Harmful Mining for Indigenous Peoples’, 15 PERSP. ECOLOGY &
CONSERVATION 152, 155 (2017).
10. See Roger Merino, Reimagining the Nation-State: Indigenous Peoples and the Making of
Plurinationalism in Latin America, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 773, 784 (2018).
11. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1962),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/NaturalResources.aspx#:~:text=Declares%20that%3A,p
eople%20of%20the%20State%20concerned.
12. Jose R. Martínez Cobo (Special Rapporteur), Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Vol. 5), at 39 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Hum. Rts. Council, Right to a Healthy Environment: Good Practices, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/53, at 17–
18 (2020).
15. U.N. ENVIRON. PROG., SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE MINING SECTOR: CURRENT STATUS AND
FUTURE TRENDS 19 (2020).
16. See Nathan Yaffe, Indigenous Consent: A Self Determination Perspective, 19 MELB. J. INT’L L. 703,
714–15 (2018).
17. Id.; see also Joseph Zarate, Opinion, The Amazon was Sick, Now It’s Sicker, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/opinion/amazon-pollution-oil.html.
18. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE MINING SECTOR, supra note 15, at 19–20.
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increased.19 In addition, building access roads for both oil extraction and mining
projects contributes to deforestation.20
Thus far, the primary legal approach Indigenous communities have used to
thwart extraction projects has been to invoke the right to consultation.21
However, this approach is insufficient if the objective is preventing
environmental harm and resource exploitation, rather than obtaining damages
and restitution.22 In landmark cases where Indigenous Peoples have invoked the
right to consultation and succeeded in gaining it, the environmental damage had
already occurred.23 Thus, there is a need for stronger procedural and substantive
protections that Indigenous communities can invoke prior to the destruction of
their lands.
In this Note, I will provide a textual analysis of the Convention and how
its approach to Indigenous land and resource rights has produced the narrow
right to consultation and how the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), by comparison, takes a more holistic conception
of Indigenous rights by incorporating the right to consultation, FPIC, and selfdetermination. I will then discuss how the Convention’s consultation
requirement and the right to FPIC has been interpreted by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and other international bodies. This section will also
address how the consultation requirement has been implemented in the LatinAmerican states that have ratified the Convention. Specifically, I will be looking
into how Bolivia and Peru have implemented the convention.
Furthermore, I will assess the status of FPIC in the private sector and how
the FPIC process is conceived in the context of obtaining a social license to
operate, despite its legal unenforceability. Lastly, I propose a FPIC process that
is shaped by the principles inherent in the right to self-determination and discuss
how it can be implemented to ultimately give Indigenous Peoples control over
the development of their land and resources. In this Note, I argue that the
interpretation and the implementation of the right to consultation in the
extractive industry reinforces western, hegemonic power structures that
subordinate Indigenous Peoples, ultimately leaving them with little to no control
over the development of their lands and natural resources. For Indigenous
19. John Vidal, How Developing Countries are Paying a High Price for the Global Mineral Boom, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2015, 6:44 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/15/
developing-countries-high-price-global-mineral-boom; SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE MINING SECTOR,
supra note 15, at 19–20.
20. John C. Cannon, Mining Covers More Than 20% of Indigenous Territory in the Amazon, MONGABAY
(Oct. 9, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/10/mining-covers-more-than-20-of-indigenous-territory-inthe-amazon (“deforestation rates are as much as three times higher on Indigenous lands with mining compared
to those without”).
21. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 ¶ 43–45 (June 27, 2012).
22. Hans Morten Haugen, Participation and Decision-making in Non-dominant Communities. A
Perspective from Civic Republicanism, 23 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 306, 313 (2016).
23. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 ¶ 43–45; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 ¶ 191 (Sept. 24, 1999).
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Peoples to obtain the necessary control over the development of their lands and
natural resources, I argue that the right to FPIC offers a procedural and
substantive pathway towards the realization of the right to self-determination
and that a proper FPIC process should be informed by self-determination.
However, since the FPIC process is a natural extension of the consultation
process, it is important that consultations are also informed by selfdetermination to produce meaningful consultations that can ground subsequent
FPIC process.
I. ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 & UNDRIP
At the time the Convention was drafted and signed in 1989, it was
considered the foremost international legal instrument addressing Indigenous
rights;24 however, a close reading of the text reveals how the Convention is
internally contradictory because it recognizes land and resource rights consistent
with the right to self-determination but later qualifies them, and ultimately grants
Indigenous Peoples a narrow participatory right. The Convention recognizes the
“collective character” of Indigenous land and resource rights by identifying how
“possessory, use and management rights” are all central to Indigenous Peoples’
physical, cultural, and spiritual survival.25
Article 7 of the Convention provides that Indigenous Peoples “shall have
the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects
their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy
or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own
economic, social and cultural development.”26 Self-determination is implicitly
woven into this section.27 The key phrases in this article—“decide their own
priorities” and “exercise control”—recognize Indigenous Peoples’ decisionmaking power. Part II of the Convention, which specifically governs land and
resource rights, carries similar expressions of self-determination. Article 13
requires that governments “respect the special importance for the cultures and
spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or
territories . . . which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the
collective aspects of this relationship.”28 Furthermore, Article 15, section 1
explicitly provides that Indigenous Peoples’ right to “participate in the use,
management and conservation of [natural] resources . . . pertaining to their lands
shall be specially safeguarded.”29

24. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions About Natural
Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and
Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 9 (2005).
25. Id.
26. Convention (No. 169), supra note 2, at art. 7.
27. Yaffe, supra note 16, at 721.
28. Convention (No. 169), supra note 2, at art. 13.
29. Id. at art. 15 § 1.
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These Articles suggest that Indigenous Peoples have broad decisionmaking power over the possession, development, management, and use of their
lands and the natural resources therein.
Article 15, section 2 is where the Convention undercuts its previous
recognition of land and resource rights, as it shifts toward state “ownership of
mineral, subsurface resources and other resources pertaining to lands.”30 The
language in this section conflicts with the previously mentioned Articles in the
Convention and contains the most severe consequences for Indigenous lands.
What is left of Indigenous land and resource rights after this section is the right
to be consulted through government-established procedures to determine the
“degree [to which] their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources
pertaining to their lands.”31
Article 6 gives some guidance on what the consultation requirement entails
by providing that consultations shall be conducted in manner that allows affected
Indigenous Peoples to “freely participate . . . at all levels of decision making,”
and that state governments provide the “means for the full development of these
peoples’ own institutions and initiatives.”32 This Article only emphasizes
participation, and providing means to ensure it, rather than actual decisionmaking. Furthermore, Article 6 maintains that consultations “shall be carried out
in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances with the objective
of achieving agreement or consent.”33 Thus, consent makes its appearance as a
goal, rather than a requirement.34
However, it remains that subsurface resources are categorically exempt
from Indigenous Peoples’ right to possess, manage, and use natural resources
“pertaining to their lands.”35 Instead of safeguarding subsurface resources,
Article 15, section 2 grants their exploitation as long as state governments
undertake a consultation procedure—one which they get to choose for
themselves. Indigenous decision-making power is entirely absent in both the
formulation of the consultation procedure and within the procedure itself.
Article 15 is inconsistent with the right to self-determination, as it adopts a
democratic, participatory rights approach.36 Under this approach, the legal
mechanisms available for Indigenous Peoples to protect their rights are based on
“western standards,” where Indigenous Peoples are “accommodated” and
30. Id. at art. 15 § 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at art. 6 § 1.
33. Id. at art. 6 § 2.
34. Id.; Article 16 returns to FPIC but maintains that this is only required for instances of relocation. State
governments are still able to go through with relocation without consent as long as they allow the affected
community to later return, or if return is not possible, they should be provided lands of the same quality of which
they were removed. State governments are also required to provide full compensation for any losses or injuries
that result from relocation. Id. at art. 16.
35. Id. at art. 15 § 1.
36. Anaya, supra note 24, at 10.
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“included” in development decisions by being able to “participate” as an “ethnic
minority,” rather than as distinct Indigenous nations.37 This participatory right
borders on being a hollow right when taking into account the asymmetric power
dynamic between Indigenous communities and state governments that are at
least somewhat influenced by the extractive industry. Under this approach, this
power imbalance is fueled by principles of liberal democratic participation
promising inclusion.38 At best, state governments would consult Indigenous
Peoples prior to undertaking an extraction project, allow for participation in the
consultation, and share the benefits of such projects, “wherever possible.”39
During the drafting of the Convention, Indigenous organizations pointed
out that rights to consultation and participation were “inadequate” and
emphasized the right “to ‘determine’ and ‘control’ their own affairs and that
economic and social self-determination should be the basic orientation” of the
Convention.40 However, the ILO Committee of Experts, taking into account
various state interests, did not agree that the right to self-determination should
appear in its “operative part,” and instead be referenced in the Preamble. 41 In
the Convention’s final version, the Preamble alluded to self-determination in the
same way it does later in the aforementioned “General Policy” section Articles.
While the aforementioned Articles are contained in the “operative part” of the
Convention, their recognition of self-determination is swiftly undercut by
Article 15, section 2, thus rendering self-determination inoperative, as was the
intention in the Convention’s drafting. Instead, consultation and participation
are hailed as the “cornerstone” of the Convention.42 The ILO Committee of
Experts has overstated the capacity of participation and consultation to protect
Indigenous rights, as Indigenous participation is characterized as an “essential
element in ensuring equity and guaranteeing social peace through inclusion and
dialogue,” and consultation being the “instrument of [that] genuine dialogue.”43
With consultation and participation being the main focus of the Convention, selfdetermination and FPIC remain in the background as elusive objectives.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) (hereinafter referred to as the “Declaration”) embodies a more
holistic approach to Indigenous rights and was adopted in 2007, with 144

37. Merino, supra note 4, at 121.
38. Riccarda Flemmer & Almut Schilling‐Vacaflor, Unfulfilled Promises of the Consultation Approach:
The Limits to Effective Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s Extractive Industries, 37 THIRD WORLD
Q. 172, 175 (2016); César Rodríguez-Garavito, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the
Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 263, 289 (Winter 2010).
39. Convention (No. 169), supra note 2, at art. 15 sec. 2.
40. INT’L LAB. ORG. [ILO], Report VI (2) Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), at 9 (1988), https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1988/88B09_44_engl.pdf.
41. INT’L LAB. ORG. [ILO], Report VI (1) Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), at 29 (1988), https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1987/87B09_172_engl.pdf.
42. INT’L LAB. STANDARDS DEP’T, INDIGENOUS & TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO
ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, at 59 (2009).
43. Id. at 60.
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member states in favor of the Declaration. 44 Self-determination and FPIC are as
central to the Declaration as consultation and participation are to the Convention.
Throughout the Declaration, there are explicit mentions of self-determination
and FPIC.45 Yet, the Convention continues to be the primary instrument
governing international Indigenous rights because the Declaration is effectively
non-binding. Practically, the entirety of the Declaration can be seen as a set of
goals that states can endeavor to achieve. This non-binding instrument is
nonetheless important because of its articulations of self-determination and
FPIC regarding Indigenous land and resource rights.
Articles 3 and 4 recognize the broad rights inherent in the right to selfdetermination. Like the Convention, Article 3 holds that Indigenous Peoples
have the right to “pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 46
However, the means by which this right should be exercised is through
Indigenous Peoples’ right to “self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs”—a right firmly grounded in self-determination.47
While consultation and participation are referred to in the Declaration, they do
not serve the same purpose in the Declaration as they do in the Convention.
Consultation and participation are positioned as preliminary rights, thus serving
as the starting point of the greater FPIC process.48 FPIC encompasses “three
interrelated and cumulative rights of Indigenous [P]eoples: the right to be
consulted; the right to participate; and the right to their lands, territories and
resources.”49 This is exemplified in Article 32, section 2:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the [I]ndigenous
[P]eoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project
affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water
or other resources.50

The obligation created in this article is clear: without any conditions or
exceptions, state governments must first consult and then obtain the affected
Indigenous community’s consent prior to any extraction project. There is no
qualifying language contained in the Declaration’s Articles pertaining to land
44. UNDRIP, supra note 5; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenouspeoples.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
45. UNDRIP, supra note 5.
46. Id. at art. 3.
47. Id. at art. 4.
48. See UNDRIP, supra note 5, at art. 38; see also ANDY GARGETT, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS. & ASIA PAC. F. OF NAT’ L HUM. RTS. INST., THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A MANUAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 34 (2013).
49. Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based Approach, supra note 7, at 5.
50. UNDRIP, supra note 5, at art. 32.
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and natural resources.51 In large part, the Declaration is able to “offer[] a more
robust protection to [I]ndigenous [P]eoples from decisions affecting them”
because of its soft law characteristics.52 That is, Indigenous Peoples do not
necessarily have the right to invoke the Declaration and the rights contained
therein if the state in which their community resides has not codified the
Declaration into its national law.
However, the Declaration can capture “the importance of lands and
resources to the survival of Indigenous cultures” by upholding the collective
nature of Indigenous Peoples’ land and resource rights.53 The Declaration does
not seek to separate “land” from “resource” or “resource” from “subsurface
resource.” Despite its unenforceability, the Declaration remains important
because it pushes self-determination and FPIC towards becoming customary
principles of international law.
A recent regional environmental agreement, the Escazú Agreement
(“Escazú”), has been signed by twenty-four countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, twelve of which have ratified it.54 Escazú has implications for
Indigenous rights, but it does not contain land or resource obligations beyond
what the Convention requires.55 Escazú went into effect on April 22, 2021.56
Escazú is consistent with the Convention, in that it requires state governments
to establish “appropriate spaces for consultation” and allow the public to
participate in decision-making on projects that might have a significant effect on
the environment.57 However, Escazú is broadly concerned with “public
participation” and makes no explicit mention of Indigenous Peoples. State
parties to Escazú still retain full sovereignty over subsurface resources, however
they must prepare an environmental impact assessment prior to undertaking an
extraction or any project which may have a significant effect on the
environment.58 Like the Convention, Escazú employs a participatory rights
approach and does not address the power asymmetries inherent in the
relationship between Indigenous Peoples and state governments. Thus,

51. Id.
52. José Parra, The Role of Domestic Courts in International Human Rights Law: The Constitutional Court
of Colombia and Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 23 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 355, 364 (2016).
53. Anaya, supra note 24, at 8–9.
54. Escazu Agreement Takes Effect, Enshrining Right to Sustainable Development, IISD: SDG
KNOWLEDGE HUB (Apr. 26, 2021), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/escazu-agreement-takes-effect-enshrining-right-tosustainable-development.
55. Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental
Matters, Caribbean-Latin-Am., art. 7, Mar. 4, 2018, https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43583/
1/S1800428_en.pdf [hereinafter Regional Agreement].
56. Press Release, Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean, Escazú Agreement Enters into Force in
Latin America and the Caribbean on International Mother Earth Day (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.cepal.org/en/
pressreleases/escazu-agreement-enters-force-latin-america-and-caribbean-international-mother-earth.
57. Regional Agreement supra note 55, at art. 7.
58. Id.
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consultation remains an “available liberal tool” for Indigenous Peoples to use to
the extent they can to protect their lands and resources.59
II. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO
CONSULTATION AND FPIC
A. INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE ILO, UN, AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Various international bodies, like the ILO and UN have interpreted what
the right to consultation entails and how it should be operationalized to protect
Indigenous Peoples’ rights to their lands and resources; however, these
international entities have no authority to enforce their interpretations on states.
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions (CEACR)
serves to “guide” state governments to ensure compliance and their observations
of state compliance is intended to have “considerable moral force.” 60 The
CEACR concluded in its general observations that the Convention does not
create nor implicitly contain a veto power for affected Indigenous
communities.61 In its 2010 General Observation, the CEACR referred back to
the negotiations of Article 15 and reviewed the substantial objections to
mandating consent to support this conclusion.62 Instead, the CEACR focused on
the consultation requirement as containing a participatory right and advised that
affected communities “participate as early as possible in the process.” 63 In a
more recent report, the ILO encouraged, but did not mandate the inclusion of
Indigenous Peoples in designing consultation procedures. 64 Here, the ILO
emphasized the procedural aspect of the right to participate in consultations.
Naturally, these interpretations put forth by the ILO remain consistent with the
Convention, where consultation, participation, and inclusion are championed as
sufficient tools for Indigenous Peoples to use to protect their lands and resources.
59. Merino, supra note 4, at 134.
60. Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Monitoring Compliance with International Labour Standards: The Key Role of
the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, at 10, 23 (2019),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_730866.pdf.
61. Parra, supra note 52, at 367.
62. Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: General Observation, Observation 2010/81, at
5 (2010) (“[O]riginal proposal that had been contained in the proposed Conclusions concerning this provision
had included the phrase “seek the consent,” which would have required that consent be obtained, it was clear
from the first discussion that this phrase was not acceptable to a sufficiently large proportion of the membership
and it could therefore not include it in the proposed text being submitted to the Conference for a second
discussion.”).
63. Id. at 8; see also James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34, at 22 (July 15, 2009)
(In 2009, Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples James Anaya stated that “consultations should
occur early in the stages of the development or planning of the proposed measure, so that indigenous peoples
may genuinely participate in and influence the decision-making.”).
64. Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Implementing the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169:
Toward and Inclusive, Sustainable and Just Future, at 120 (2020).
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However, these “liberal tool[s]” stop short of allowing Indigenous Peoples from
occupying decision-maker position, and instead promise that they will be able
to “influence” the decision-making process.65
In 2012, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, and now Dean of University of Colorado Law School, James Anaya
articulated the “[n]eed for an approach that comprehensively takes account of
the rights that may be affected by extractive operations.”66 Thus, Anaya found
the consultation requirement as more than a “stand alone right” and instead
urged that the focus shift toward protecting Indigenous Peoples’ substantive
rights to land and resources rather than on procedures contained in the right to
consultation.67 Recently, former UN Special Rapporteur Victoria Lucia TauliCorpuz echoed this point by explaining that “the starting point for analysing
consultation and consent is evaluation of the substantive rights of [I]ndigenous
[P]eoples that would be at stake.”68 While the ILO and UN Special Rapportuer
interpretations of the right to consultation are useful because these international
bodies serve as norm entrepreneurs, their interpretations ultimately have no
binding effect.
On the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the “IAC”)
has offered a binding interpretation of the right to consultation regarding
extraction projects that it developed and reaffirmed over the course of deciding
two prominent cases. However, the IAC missed an opportunity to develop its
jurisprudence on the right to FPIC. In the first case, Saramaka v. Suriname, the
state government granted mining and logging concessions without consulting
the Saramaka community. Like the approach suggested by the UN Special
Rapporteurs, the IAC began its analysis by focusing on the substantive right to
property under Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights.69 The
IAC recognized the distinct relationship the Saramaka peoples share with their
lands and the resources therein as part of their “social, ancestral, and spiritual
essence.”70
Because the IAC recognized that land and resources are inextricably linked
to the cultural, spiritual, and physical survival of the Saramaka people, it was
65. Merino, supra note 4, at 134.
66. James Anaya (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/21/47, at 12 (July 6, 2012).
67. Id. at 13.
68. Victoria Lucia Tauli-Corpuz (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/45/34, at 13 (June 18, 2020).
69. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 95 (Nov. 28, 2007) (The Saramaka Community could not bring this case under the ILO
Convention 169 because Suriname had not ratified the Convention. With the advent of ILO Convention 169 the
Court has found the right to consultation implicit in the right to property); see also Lillian Aponte Miranda,
Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure
Systems and International Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional Lands and Resources in
Latin America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 419, 439–40 (2009); see also Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v.
Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 ¶ 145 (June 27, 2012).
70. Saramaka v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, at ¶ 82.
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unable to fully agree with the government’s claim that it had a right to grant
mining and logging concessions without consultations.71 However, the IAC did
not go so far as to say that the Saramaka’s right to property was absolute either.72
The IAC fell in between these two positions to hold that the “[s]tate may restrict
the Saramakas’ right to use and enjoy their traditionally owned lands and natural
resources only when it does not deny their survival as a tribal people.”73 The
IAC developed a “safeguard test” to determine whether the state had restricted
the Saramaka’s right to land and resources to such an extent that it denied their
survival as a tribal people.74 Under this “safeguard test” the state must:
[1] ensure the effective participation of the members of the Saramaka people,
in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development,
investment, exploration or extraction plan . . . within Saramaka
territory . . . [2] guarantee that the Saramakas will receive a reasonable benefit
from any such plan within their territory . . . [3] ensure that no concession will
be issued within Saramaka territory unless and until independent and
technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision, perform a prior
environmental and social impact assessment.75

By not conducting any consultations prior to granting mining and logging
concessions, the IAC held that the state failed the safeguard test.76 In its holding,
the IAC also made an important distinction in its analysis of the Saramaka’s
right to the gold underneath their lands. The Saramaka people claimed that they
had a general right to “own everything, from the very top of the trees to the very
deepest place that you could go under the ground,” even if they did not
traditionally use those subsurface resources which laid beneath their lands. 77 In
response to this claim, the IAC concluded that even if the Saramakas did not
traditionally use the gold underneath their lands, they were still entitled to
consultation because the indirect impacts of the mining would “affect other
natural resources necessary for the[ir] survival.”78
On top of the consultation process, which requires that all the safeguard
test elements be met “when planning development or investment projects within
traditional Saramaka territory,” the IAC also held that “major development or
investment plans that may have a profound impact on the property rights of the
members of the Saramaka people to a large part of their territory . . . additionally

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at ¶ 124.
Id. at ¶ 127.
Id. at ¶ 128.
Id. at ¶ 129.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 154.
See id. at ¶ 155.
Id.
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require the free, prior, and informed consent.”79 However, the IAC did not
clarify what it meant by “profound impact.” Additionally, the IAC did not
distinguish between types of projects that would necessarily “deny” Indigenous
Peoples their “survival as a tribal people” that would trigger the consultation
requirement and projects that would have such “profound impacts” that would
additionally require FPIC.
Following this case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) clarified what the Saramaka court meant by a “major development
project” that would have a “profound impact” on an Indigenous community’s
property rights. The IACHR is one of the institutions within the Inter-American
System, and like the IAC, serves to protect human rights.80 The IACHR
categorized FPIC as a “heightened safeguard” and identified three situations
where FPIC would be mandatory, which included instances that would (1)
displace or require the relocation of the community, (2) deprive community
members of their lands and natural resources “necessary for their subsistence,”
and (3) include the storage or disposal of hazardous materials on the
community’s land.81 While the instances where FPIC may be triggered are
narrow, this interpretation of FPIC goes beyond what is required by the
Convention and thus suggests that FPIC is a right that Indigenous communities
are entitled to, rather than being a distant promise.82
Three years later, the Court came down with Sarayaku v. Ecuador, in which
the IAC carried forth the same approach and applied the safeguard test to
evaluate the adequacy of Ecuador’s consultation process, but surprisingly
remained silent on FPIC.83 The Sarayaku people claimed that the state had
violated their right to property by not conducting consultations and obtaining
their consent prior to authorizing oil exploration.84 In this case, the “company
opened seismic lines, established heliports, destroyed caves, and water sources
and subterranean rivers that provided the community’s drinking water; cut trees
and plants of environmental, cultural and nutritional value to the Sarayaku, and
placed powerful explosives on the surface and in the subsoil of the territory.”85
Despite the FPIC claim, the IAC’s reliance on Article 6 of the Convention
79. Id. at ¶ 137.
80. What is the IACHR?, ORG. AM. STS: INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., https://www.oas.org/en/
IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
81. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over their Ancestral Lands and
Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 56/09 ¶ 334 (2009).
82. It is important to note that these three categories that the Commission outlined also run into other rights
enshrined in other international treaties, like the right to life in the American Convention. The advancement of
FPIC can be seen as a procedural right that can apply to other substantive human rights, and thus widen the
scope of approaches courts can take to advance this procedural right. See American Convention on Human
Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” arts. 4, 21, Nov. 11, 1969, 144 U.N.T.S. 17955; see also Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, supra note 81, at ¶ 334.
83. See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 245, at ¶ 156.
84. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 172.
85. Id.
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allowed it to effectively “sidestep”86 a FPIC analysis and instead turn its focus
to and affirm the right to consultation not only as mandated by the Convention,
but also a customary principle in international law.87 The IAC’s approach here
is crucial. If the IAC had drawn on the IACHR’s three categories of when FPIC
is mandated, the IAC would have had the opportunity to analyze whether the
environmental harm rose to a level that triggered the need for FPIC.
Additionally, the IAC’s silence here impliedly narrows the application of FPIC
and suggests that even when an Indigenous community’s water sources and
other natural resources are destroyed or threatened, these circumstances are not
severe enough to warrant FPIC.
Instead, the IAC decided to clarify Ecuador’s obligations under the
consultation requirement. Here, the state delegated its consultation obligations
to the oil company.88 The oil company made attempts to consult the Saramaka
peoples, which included offering the community money, gifts, or wages for
working on the project.89 Additionally, the company prepared its own
environmental impact assessment, which the state approved. The IAC decided
not to evaluate the adequacy of these procedures and instead held that Ecuador
is not permitted to delegate away its consultation responsibilities.90 Thus,
Ecuador had failed the safeguard test because the consultation mandated by the
IAC and in the Convention never occurred, thus rendering the consultation
process in this case insufficient.91
While both decisions produced favorable outcomes for the Indigenous
communities, they remained largely within the bounds of the Convention. Even
with the IAC addressing FPIC in the Saramaka decision and the IACHR’s
subsequent clarification of the right, the Sarayaku decision completely bypassed
any discussion of FPIC. Thus, the jurisprudence that the Saramaka decision and
the IACHR began to develop on FPIC was halted by the Sarayaku decision,
leaving the applicability of FPIC unclear, and possibly even narrower than what
was intended in the Saramaka decision.
However, these cases did produce more tangible and detailed obligations
that states must meet to fulfill the consultation requirement. Sarayaku made it
clear that the consultation requirement cannot be delegated to a private entity
and the safeguard test from Saramaka gives states a roadmap for properly
conducting consultations. These decisions are helpful clarifications of states’
consultation duties under the Convention. Yet, by staying within the bounds of

86. Aled Dilwyn Fisher & Maria Lundberg, Human Rights’ Legitimacy in the Face of the Global
Ecological Crisis – Indigenous Peoples, Ecological Rights Claims and the Inter-American Human Rights
System, 6 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 177, 193 (2015).
87. See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 245, at ¶ 165.
88. Id. at ¶ 199.
89. Id. at ¶ 73.
90. Id. at ¶ 199.
91. Convention (No. 169), supra note 2, at art. 6 (the Convention explicitly states that “governments shall
consult the peoples concerned”).
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the Convention, the IAC engaged more in gap-filling than expanding Indigenous
Peoples’ procedural rights. However, the importance of these decisions should
not be understated. The IAC’s acknowledgement of the spiritual, cultural, and
social connections that Indigenous Peoples have to their lands affirms
Indigenous methods of development.92 However, the IAC’s missed opportunity
to develop a more comprehensive jurisprudence on FPIC weakens its
applicability in international law.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT: BOLIVIA AND PERU
Both Bolivia and Peru have ratified the Convention and enacted legislation
codifying the consultation requirement in their domestic law. In the wake of the
IAC’s jurisprudence on this subject, these two states’ implementation of the
consultation requirement reveals its fundamental inability to function as an
adequate safeguard for Indigenous Peoples’ right to land and natural resources
and to rightly address the oppressive relationship between the state and
Indigenous Peoples. Problems with implementing the consultation requirement
include the unilateral state framework and authority over consultation
procedures and a reciprocal knowledge gap that stifles communication and
participation. Within this reciprocal knowledge gap, there is lack of technical
knowledge on the Indigenous community’s side and a lack of cultural
knowledge on the state’s side.
In 2005, Bolivia enacted legislation that codified the consultation
requirement with its last amendment thereof made in 2014. 93 Adopting the
consultation requirement was an important step for Bolivia, which has a sizeable
Indigenous population.94 Implementation procedures, however, have not been
carried out in the most meaningful fashion. Before consultations begin, the
Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy (MHE), which is the state agency that is
responsible for carrying out consultations, allows the affected community to
submit a proposed consultation plan.
However, due to budget constraints, the agency limits these plans to a large
extent.95 In practice, the agency relies on consultation procedures that it has

92. See Miranda, supra note 69, at 444 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and InterAmerican Court of Human Rights have interpreted the right to property, when applied to indigenous peoples’
lands and resources, to embody norms of communal, collective occupancy and control as well as of religious
and cultural value. Although an in-depth acknowledgement of the peculiarities and nuances of a particular
indigenous community’s land tenure system may not be reflected in these bodies’ final decisions, the
identification and recognition of such broadly conceived core, normative precepts nevertheless constitute a step
in the right direction.).
93. José Aylwin & Pablo Policzer, No Going Back: The Impact of ILO Convention on Latin America in
Comparative Perspective, 13 UNIV. OF CALGARY SCH. PUB. POL’Y PUBL’NS 1, 4 (2020).
94. Indigenous World 2019: Bolivia, INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFS. (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.iwgia.org/en/bolivia/3389-iw2019-bolivia.html (according to Bolivia’s 2012 National Census, 41%
of the state’s population aged 15 and over is of Indigenous origin).
95. Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 38, at 178.
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designed itself.96 This gives the appearance of Indigenous inclusion and
influence in the decision-making process, yet the reality is that these procedures
are designed by bureaucrats who seek to expedite the consultation process. In
addition, Bolivia has manipulated the consultation process by scheduling the
consultations very late, where “contracts with the responsible companies had
already been signed and the respective project’s details had already been
established,” leaving no space to meaningfully consider the affected
community’s concerns.97
By imposing its own consultation procedures, the state agency is culturally
ill-equipped to communicate with affected communities because it is unfamiliar
with cultural practices and methods of communication. During one consultation
in 2013, the Indigenous communities requested that their elderly community
members serve as their official advisors, however the state agency rejected this
request because, as a policy matter, it decided that community members with
bachelor’s degrees would be better suited for such a position. 98 From the state’s
point of view, this is a practical policy and facilitates better communication
between the state and community members who might be able to better
understand the complexities of a hydrocarbon project.99 However, interviews
with affected Indigenous communities “show that there is a general discontent
with the results of the consultation process . . . because of the limited
opportunities the consultation participants have had to co-design the planned
projects.”100 Unilateral state control over the consultation procedures also
dictates what issues get prioritized in the consultation itself and consequently
affects the Indigenous community’s ability to defend its interests. 101 While
Indigenous communities may raise important concerns about the project’s
socioenvironmental impacts, the state has the authority to swiftly review and
address these concerns and give more weight to the project’s technical
aspects.102
Given the state agency’s reluctance to give up unilateral control over
consultation procedures, affected communities turn to compensation
negotiations to establish a compensation fund to mitigate the project’s future
impacts to obtain some “tangible results.”103 This reduction of the consultation
process undermines the purpose of the consultation procedure. The consultation
requirement, as interpreted by the UN Special Rapporteurs and the IAC, is a
procedural tool to facilitate dialogue between the state and Indigenous
community so that the state understands the community’s interests and

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
See id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 181.
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ultimately protects their substantive land and resource rights.104 Yet in this case,
discussions concerning the community’s rights and livelihood are suppressed,
leaving little space for intercultural dialogue and diluting the right to
consultation initially granted in the Convention.105 However, Bolivia’s methods
of carrying out consultations have not gone unnoticed.
Bolivia’s consultation process has also been assessed by the CEACR. In
2019, the CEACR conducted an observation of Bolivia and noted that the state
was not in compliance with Article 15 of the Convention.106 Along with Bolivia
scheduling the consultations later in the project timeline, 107 the CEACR
observed that Bolivia had adopted a policy of limiting consultations to a
maximum of three meetings that could not take place over any longer than four
months.108 After its observation, the CEACR highlighted that Bolivia’s
consultations “must be adapted to the situation of the peoples concerned,
ensuring that the communities affected participate as early as possible in the
process,” so that communities can ultimately influence the outcome of the
process.109 To encourage compliance, the CEACR requested that Bolivia
“indicate the manner in which the consultation processes . . . have taken into
account the decision-making institutions and procedures of the peoples
concerned.”110 Thus, the CEAR has compelled the Bolivian government to
consider the extent to which the state has permitted Indigenous decision-making
in its consultations. This forces the Bolivian government to confront the fact that
it has convoluted the purpose of the consultation requirement.
Peru has faced similar problems with implementing its consultation
process. Peru also has a large Indigenous population that “includes more than 4
million [I]ndigenous persons, of whom 83.11% are Quechua, 10.92% Aymara,
1.67% Ashaninka, and 4.31% belong to other Amazonian [I]ndigenous
peoples.”111 Additionally, with 75% of the Peruvian Amazon already subject to
oil and gas concessions, Indigenous communities who reside in and rely on the
Amazon rainforest are profoundly impacted by the extraction industry.112 Like
Bolivia, Peru has employed various methods for streamlining the consultation
process in a way that advances its development and economic interests. These
methods include imposing state-designed procedures, seemingly arbitrary

104. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
105. See Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 38, at 182.
106. INT’L LAB. ORG. [ILO], Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published 109th ILC session (2021)
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) - Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (Ratification: 1991)
(2019), http://ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:4023317 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2022).
107. See Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 38, at 180.
108. See ILO, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Indigenous Peoples in Peru, INT’L WORK GP. FOR I NDIGENOUS AFFS., https://www.iwgia.org/en/
peru.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
112. Id.
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consultation scheduling, and limiting contact and communication with the
affected communities.
Perupetro, Peru’s oil agency that is responsible for carrying out
consultations, invites affected communities to partake in the planning of the
consultation procedures; however, these plans are almost immediately limited
by budget constraints.113 Again, this tactic serves to provide the illusion of
Indigenous participation and decision-making. Furthermore, like Bolivia, Peru
has manipulated its consultation process, but has done so by holding the
consultations “very early, before any concrete project has been designed.” 114
With consultations being held so early in a project’s timeline, the affected
community might make demands or request measures that might not even apply
to the final project or the project might impact the community in a way it could
not foresee.115 Additionally, Perupetro only allows discussions with “few
designated [I]ndigenous representatives” and when the agency conducts
presentations about the impacts of extractions to the larger community, it does
so with faulty translations and technical language, making it difficult for other
community participants to understand the impacts.116
The implementation of the consultation requirement in Bolivia and Peru
demonstrates that the consultation requirement maintains Indigenous
marginalization by making the consultation process an “invited space” that is
dominated by the state.117 Thus, in practice, the consultation process is primarily
something that happens to the affected Indigenous community, where the
Indigenous community occupies the position of an “invited participant.”118
State-imposed procedures end up exacerbating the adversarial relationship
between Indigenous communities and the state government because Indigenous
communities are expected to conform to the state procedures, but the state does
not impose any measures on itself to show the affected community that it
respects their interests. Discretionary language in the Convention that merely
encourages states to use Indigenous decision-making procedures results in statedominated consultations. While the objectives contained in the Convention are
intended to lessen the burdens of compliance, in lesser developed countries
where national development is prioritized like Bolivia and Peru, the goals
contained in the Convention end up falling to the wayside. The right to
participation being the only enforceable requirement in the consultation process
demonstrates how in practice the remaining nonobligatory components of the
consultation requirement render it incapable of enforcing its intended purpose.
Thus, the participatory right contained in the consultation requirement wantonly

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor, supra note 38, at 178.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 177.

1164

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:4

holds Indigenous Peoples at arm’s length and impairs their ability to be decisionmakers, thus perpetuating their subordination and marginalization by the state.
III. FPIC AS A FORM OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY?
While the parties to the Convention are only required to conduct
consultations, non-state actors, such as the International Council on Mining and
Metals (ICMM), have attempted to adopt FPIC. 119 For mining companies, FPIC
is a measure they can take to obtain a “social license to operate” with a social
license existing “when a mining project is seen as having the ongoing approval
and broad acceptance of society to conduct its activities.”120 However, FPIC has
taken on a more liberal meaning for these non-state actors and consequently
bears no connection to self-determination.121 Under this “corporate vision” of
FPIC, obtaining FPIC is framed as a “good practice” and leaves discretion and
decision-making power with the company.122 However, under the standards set
by the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), FPIC is a
requirement rather than a “good practice,” which indicates that other actors in
the mining industry are attempting to strengthen the standards for obtaining a
“social license to operate.”
Founded in 2001, the ICMM was established to promote sustainability in
the mining industry.123 ICMM members are expected to follow ICMM’s Mining
Principles, in which the organization outlined good practices in a guide for
environmentally conscious and socially responsible mining. 124 Principle 3
expects members to “[r]espect human rights and the interests, cultures, customs
and values of employees and communities affected by [mining] activities.” 125
Under this principle, members are expected to work to obtain FPIC of
Indigenous Peoples where “significant adverse impacts” are “likely to occur.”126
The ICMM asserts that “every ICMM company member adheres to [its] Mining
Principles, which incorporates comprehensive environmental, social and
governance requirements, robust site-level validation of performance
expectations and credible assurance of corporate sustainability.”127 The
economic incentive for joining the ICMM is that membership gives companies
119. See INT’L FIN. CORP. [IFC], Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples, at 3 (2012) (Under its
Performance Standards, the IFC has also adopted its own version of FPIC).
120. Jason Prno and D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of ‘Social License to Operate’ in the Mining
Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37 RES. POL’Y 346 (2012).
121. Yaffe, supra note 16, at 715–17.
122. Id. at 725.
123. About Us, INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/about-us (last visited
Apr. 20, 2022).
124. Member Requirements, INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/aboutus/member-requirements (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
125. Mining Principles, INT’L C OUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, https://www.icmm.com/mining-principles
(last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
126. INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS [ICMM], GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
MINING 28 (2d ed. 2015).
127. About Us, supra note 123.
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the status of operating responsibly, thus bolstering their international reputation.
There is also an incentive to secure cooperation from an affected community as
a means to ensure a timely and non-interrupted project. However, the ICMM
does not require that its members submit reports, nor does it conduct its own
monitoring to ensure compliance with the Mining Principles. Despite ICMM’s
claim that all its members follow the Mining Principles, a closer look at these
principles—namely Principle 3—reveals that they are merely objectives that
companies are encouraged to achieve, and not enforceable standards.
Principle 3, which sets out “good practices” for obtaining FPIC is an
example of how corporate actors have modified the meaning and scope of FPIC
to fit within liberal notions of participatory governance. ICMM’s approach to
FPIC “seeks to respect the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples . . . while
seeking to balance the legitimate interests of all stakeholders,
including . . . governments and industry.”128 Under ICMM’s meaning of FPIC,
Indigenous communities are just one of the “many ‘stakeholders’” involved in
the development of a mining project.129 By positioning Indigenous Peoples as
fellow stakeholders, their rights and interests become de-centered in actions that
will have impacts on their lands and natural resources. The classification of
“stakeholder” connotes the right to participate and be included in the decisionmaking process, but the practice of “balancing” all the stakeholders’ interests
suggests that each party has the power to defend and negotiate on behalf of its
own interests. Thus, this “stakeholder status”130 obscures Indigenous Peoples’
distinct position as a historically marginalized and subordinated group of people.
This iteration of FPIC does not support the right to self-determination because
Indigenous Peoples are unable to freely decide how to develop their ancestral
lands if their interests are outweighed by industry or the state government’s
interests, which, given the realities of these kinds of cases, seems likely to almost
always be the case.131
Like the IAC’s interpretation, the Guide limits the application of FPIC to
instances when a proposed project is likely to have significant adverse
impacts.132 This implies that Indigenous Peoples’ right to decide what occurs on
their land should only be invoked in severe circumstances, and even in those
circumstances, Indigenous decision-making power is hamstrung by corporate
and state actors. However, the Guide also encourages practices intended to
reduce tension and hostility between mining companies and Indigenous
communities, such as using a “trusted intermediary” to help facilitate

128. GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: I NDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING, supra note 126, at 25.
129. Yaffe, supra note 16, at 726 (2018).
130. Id. at 727.
131. See id. at 726; GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING, supra note 126, at 25.
132. GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: I NDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING, supra note 126, at 28, 85 (“An impact of
significance is not any impact; “significant” means important, notable or of consequence, having regard to its
context or intensity. Similarly, “adverse” means a harm or detriment that cannot be easily remedied; it is
something more than a temporary inconvenience or disruption and cannot be fully mitigated.”).
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meetings.133 While such measures are useful to creating a more cordial
environment, none of the measures mentioned in the Guide include
communicating or obtaining consent for actions that are just shy of “significantly
adverse.”134 While this limitation on FPIC is consistent with the Convention135
and the IAC’s jurisprudence,136 as a corporate actor, the ICMM is free to set
more ambitious goals for its members but it has not done so.
The ICMM has further limited the scope of FPIC by retaining much of the
control over the procedures for obtaining consent. The Guide encourages
companies to use Indigenous communities’ “traditional decision-making
structures as much as possible.”137 Given that this Guide serves to provide “good
practices” and to enforce requirements, it is not surprising to see the qualifying
language “as much as possible,” whereby the company can implement this
measure at its discretion. The Guide does recognize the “power imbalances”
between companies and Indigenous communities,138 but does not provide
adequate measures for addressing the power imbalances it identifies. Under the
Guide’s “practical steps” to facilitate effective negotiations, it suggests
“agreeing on the negotiation process and procedures through a
memorandum.”139 This is where positioning Indigenous Peoples as stakeholders
is also unfitting. This “practical step” would be fitting for two stakeholders
where there is presumably equal bargaining power, however, in this context,
Indigenous communities likely do not have the means to negotiate for their own
decision-making procedures. Additionally, the Guide maintains that “a party is
not required to continue negotiations where it believes agreement will not be
possible” and “in cases where agreement cannot be achieved . . . it will be up to
the companies to decide whether they should remain involved in the project.”140
Thus, the onus of negotiation is implicitly shifted onto the Indigenous
community because, realistically, the company does not stand to lose anything
if consent is not obtained. If the Indigenous community were to want to design
its own procedures for the FPIC process, the company would essentially have to
sign off on the decision; the community cannot unilaterally make this decision.
However, past communities have attempted to thwart projects through collective
action and protests, which can stall projects.141
Throughout the Guide, ICMM explicitly acknowledges the asymmetric
power dynamic between Indigenous communities and companies, as well as
Indigenous Peoples’ “special relationship to land, territories and resources on
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 85.
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Id. at 83.
Id. at 83, 86.
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which companies want to explore and mine.”142 Thus, the Guide is presented as
a “toolkit” for companies to address power imbalances, resolve problems that
arise between companies and Indigenous communities, and ultimately obtain
FPIC.143 Yet, these “tools” are not adapted to properly address the power
asymmetries between Indigenous communities and companies. Instead, these
“tools,” with their “practical steps,” are intended to produce outcomes that
companies can memorialize on a page, thus demonstrating the performative
aspect of this kind of FPIC approach. Under this “corporate vision” of FPIC,
principles inherent in the right to self-determination are absent and the FPIC
process is reduced to a socially responsible “formality.”144 Overall, this
voluntary FPIC approach brings us back to the baseline of consultation because
the ICMM has not actually set FPIC as a standard with which companies are
required to comply.
The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), founded in
2006, offers a different corporate social responsibility scheme for mining—one
that is informed by self-determination. This multi-stakeholder organization
offers “independent third-party verification and certification against a
comprehensive standard for all mined materials.”145 An independent auditor will
score a mine site with the highest possible score being 100 points. If a mine site
receives a score below 50 then it will not be certified.146 IRMA only certifies the
mine sites, but companies in the jewelry or electronics industry can become
members by making a commitment to only source metals from IRMA-certified
mines.147 Under this mine-certification scheme, IRMA requires that new mine
sites obtain FPIC to become certified.148 In its “Policy Commitment,” IRMA
requires that operating companies publicly commit to the rights of Indigenous
Peoples enshrined in UNDRIP.149 Additionally, while ICMM’s “good practices”

142. GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: I NDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING, supra note 126, at 10.
143. Id. at 51.
144. Lisbet Christoffersen, Contextualizing Consent: Spaces for Repression, Resistance, and
Accommodation in Bolivia’s TIPNIS Consultation, LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN ETHNIC STUD. 1, 4 (2020) (“Rather
than an iterative process of dialogue, FPIC has turned into a formality . . . .”).
145. About Us, INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE, https://responsiblemining.net/about/
about-us (last visited Apr. 20, 2022); see also Certification, INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE,
https://responsiblemining.net/what-we-do/certification (last visited Apr. 20, 2022); About Us, FOREST
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fsc.org/en/about-us (last visited Apr. 20, 2022) (the Forest Stewardship Council
employs a similar certification scheme for forests).
146. Ryan Stuart, In a World that Needs Metals, How Can We Mine More Responsibly?, THE NARWHAL
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://thenarwhal.ca/responsible-mining-deer-horn-irma.
147. Business, INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE, https://responsiblemining.net/what-youcan-do/businesses [https://web.archive.org/web/20210123005403/https://responsiblemining.net/what-you-cando/businesses/] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022); see also Members/Partners, INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING
ASSURANCE, https://responsiblemining.net/about/members-partners [https://web.archive.org/web/
20200513035716/https://responsiblemining.net/what-you-can-do/businesses/] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
148. INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE, IRMA STANDARD FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING
IRMA-STD-001 20 (2018).
149. Id. at 26.
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establish a discretionary approach to FPIC, IRMA instills enforceable
requirements and is focused on accountability and transparency.
Unlike the ICMM Guide, IRMA’s standard does not restrict FPIC to
instances in which there are “significant adverse impacts, but instead maintains
that FPIC is triggered in “situations where mining-related activities may affect
[I]ndigenous [P]eoples’ rights or interests.”150 By making FPIC applicable to a
wider range of situations, IRMA’s standard opens more opportunities for
intercultural dialogue. As for the FPIC procedures, if an affected Indigenous
community has an “FPIC protocol in place or under development, the operating
company shall abide by it” and if no such protocol exists, the company must
cooperate with the Indigenous community to establish a FPIC process. 151
IRMA’s FPIC process is informed by self-determination because Indigenous
communities are able to freely design and decide the procedures for obtaining
their consent. Decision-making power is specifically granted to the affected
Indigenous community and required if the company is seeking mine
certification. Thus, IRMA has gone beyond consultation and set a higher
standard for engaging with Indigenous Peoples.
While IRMA has set seemingly sufficient standards for companies to
comply with, the shortcoming of this scheme is in its popularity. Currently, no
mine sites have been certified under IRMA’s standards.152 However, with the
popularity of other certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council
and the Marine Stewardship Council, and as consumers push for more
environmentally sustainable and ethical products, “sustainable certification
could become increasingly important in securing financing.”153 Deer Horn, a
mining company, is currently undergoing an audit for one of its proposed mine
sites and has publicly announced its commitment to UNDRIP and obtaining the
First Nations Peoples’ FPIC.154 Thus, while this IRMA may not be as popular
as other organizations employing similar certification schemes, it is certainly a
norm entrepreneur in this context and has potential to gain more traction as
metals for electronic devices and renewable energy increase in demand.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The right to consultation and the dominant corporate interpretation of FPIC
are structurally ill-equipped mechanisms for protecting Indigenous Peoples’
right to their lands and natural resources. The common thread in both
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23, 2020), https://biv.com/article/2020/09/does-mining-need-good-housekeeping-seal-approval.
154. Irma Engagement Map: Mining Site: Deer Horn Gold-Silver-Tellurium Mine (Proposed), INITIATIVE
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mechanisms is that the right to self-determination is absent, yet it is “the
recognition of . . . ‘self-determination’ that has been central to [Indigenous
Peoples’] demands at the international level.”155 The right to consultation, as
originally set out in the Convention, was not intended to bear any connection to
the right to self-determination and notions of Indigenous decision-making, but
instead to the right of participation and inclusion.156 Unsurprisingly, in its
implementation, the right to consultation compels affected Indigenous
communities to participate in the consultation process in a manner that best suits
the state and consequently the extraction industry. Even the IAC’s ruling on
FPIC has framed FPIC as a heightened safeguard that is only available when
there are extreme impacts, essentially rendering FPIC an unworkable standard
that can seldom be invoked. Additionally, corporate actors in the mining
industry, like the ICMM, purport to engage in the FPIC process, yet deploy
similar participatory measures seen in the consultation process in which the
company retains all the decision-making authority and can grant some of that
authority to the affected Indigenous community at its discretion. Given that the
current interpretations of FPIC are removed from the right to self-determination,
I propose a FPIC process that is informed by self-determination and that could
be used by Indigenous Peoples to protect their lands and natural resources.
Such a FPIC process would first grant affected Indigenous communities
the authority to decide and design the procedures for obtaining their consent, and
second would contain the right to withhold consent. Due to FPIC being the
natural extension of the consultation process, this FPIC approach would also
require states to abide by consultation procedures set by the affected Indigenous
community. This would mean that the state and operating company would be
required to follow a consultation and FPIC protocol that has been specifically
created for and by the affected Indigenous community.
Indigenous communities in Colombia have produced FPIC protocols that
contain appropriate measures for engagement. The Resguardo communities
occupy ancestral territory in Colombia that has a long history of gold mining,
Indigenous repression, and violence.157 Due to this fraught history between
mining companies and the Resguardo communities, under their FPIC protocol
they specified that “any external oversight of their decision-making processes is
considered disrespectful of the communities’ autonomy,” thus excluding state
and company representatives from influencing the consultation and consent
procedures.158 This FPIC protocol allows the communities to develop
procedures and make decisions without the possibility of manipulation from the
state or the company.159 While this FPIC protocol was established in 2012, it has
155. Merino, supra note 4, at 126.
156. See discussion supra Part II.
157. CATHAL DOYLE & JILL CARIÑO, MAKING FREE PRIOR & INFORMED CONSENT A REALITY: INDIGENOUS
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not yet been applied to mining projects but nevertheless demonstrates that
Indigenous communities can and have made demands for how they want the
state and companies to engage with them.
The Indigenous communities in Peru have not developed their own FPIC
protocols but have provided some alternatives for the state’s consultation
procedures. The Indigenous communities requested that the state agency
responsible for carrying out consultations be one that specializes in Indigenous
issues and employs indigenous persons, rather than the state’s oil agency. 160
Additionally, the communities expressed their discontent toward the unilateral
design of consultation procedures and the state’s reluctance to identify any
instances in which FPIC might be triggered.161 While the Resguardo’s FPIC
protocol contains more uncompromising demands, both communities
represented here have pushed for designing their own consultation and FPIC
procedures, underscoring the importance of adopting such a measure in a FPIC
process. Giving affected Indigenous communities the authority to design their
own FPIC protocol could promote intercultural dialogue and respect between
the state and the affected community. If a state were to adopt this measure, it
would be compelled to engage with the affected community in a culturally
appropriate manner. Consequently, the state would be addressing the cultural
knowledge gap between itself and the community. Adopting this procedure
would eliminate the discretionary authority that state governments have under
the Convention, which merely encourages them to use the affected community’s
traditional decision-making procedures.
As for the second prong of my FPIC proposal, withholding consent would
mean that the affected community could “withhold consent temporarily because
of deficiencies in the process.”162 While there has been debate as to whether
FPIC contains a veto right, these arguments “tend to detract from and undermine
the legitimacy of the [FPIC] concept.”163 FPIC as containing a veto right is the
most “progressive”164 interpretation of FPIC; however, opposing arguments
shift the focus away from FPIC as a valuable mechanism for protecting
Indigenous Peoples’ substantive rights to land and natural resources, and onto
FPIC as a threat to state sovereignty over natural resources. Instead, withholding
consent would practically mean that the affected Indigenous community could
delay the proposed project until the state is willing to engage in meaningful
negotiations. In these types of engagements in which affected Indigenous
communities’ objections to a certain course of action might not affect the
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ultimate decision, “withholding consent can . . . communicate legitimate distrust
in the consultation process or national initiative.”165
This FPIC process gets closer to operationalizing the right to selfdetermination by transforming state and Indigenous engagements from a space
where Indigenous communities were “invited” into a space that Indigenous
communities can “claim” and control themselves.166 Within this “claimed
space,”167 Indigenous communities set the terms of engagement. Granting
Indigenous communities the authority to design the FPIC procedures and
withhold consent does not amount to the denial of state sovereignty,168 but
instead acknowledges the historically distinct position Indigenous Peoples hold
with their settler states and their historic lands. FPIC recognizes Indigenous
Peoples as nations themselves, rather than ethnic minorities that can be included
and accommodated under the “dominant nation.”169 Thus, FPIC in this form
pushes against states’ own development interests and provides space for
Indigenous Peoples to offer alternative development methods.
CONCLUSION
The consultation requirement, born out of ILO Convention 169, has led to
procedural box checking and empty promises. This liberal participatory rights
approach to Indigenous land and resource rights, even in its broadest
interpretation, is unable to account for the longstanding marginalization and
subordination of Indigenous Peoples. The fundamental problem with this
approach is that it disregards how the western property regime, which separates
land from its natural resources, is a colonial vestige that can be used by states to
justify the exploitation of natural resources and simultaneously promote the
“internal colonization” of Indigenous communities.170
FPIC, on the other hand, confronts this problem by giving Indigenous
Peoples the decision-making power that is necessary for their interests to stand
up against state interests. FPIC, which contains the right to withhold consent but
not necessarily a veto right, properly distributes power to the state, extractive
companies, and Indigenous communities. This formulation of FPIC would allow
affected Indigenous communities to withhold consent as a means to come to a
genuine agreement and effectively force state governments to communicate and
negotiate with their Indigenous communities in a meaningful way. Since this
type of FPIC process has yet to take hold in both domestic and international law,
it raises the question of how it should enter the legal arena. It might be that
corporate actors, like IRMA, will be pressured to shoulder the responsibility of
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implementing a meaningful FPIC procedure as developing countries tend to take
the position that protecting Indigenous land and resource rights to a heightened
degree places an undue burden on their national development.

